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ARGUMENT 
I 
CALAME'S RESEARCH OF THE REAL McCOY WAS NOT 
A "BUSINESS PURSUIT" AS DEFINED IN USAA'S POLICIES 
AND COVERAGE FOR CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF 
HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE REAL McCOY 
IS NOT EXCLUDED 
In point I of its argument USAA cites Fire Ins. Exchange 
vs. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that "the 
primary purpose of a homeowner's policy is to provide package 
coverage for exposures incidental to home ownership. . . " (USAA's 
Brief p. 8). Because Calame's involvement with The Real McCoy was 
not incidental to home ownership, USAA argues, USAA need not defend 
or indemnify Calame in the McCoy lawsuit. However, Alsop does not 
and cannot stand for the proposition USAA claims it does and 
reliance on Alsop is an attempt to divert this courts attention 
from the policy language at issue in this case and established law 
regarding insurance contract interpretation. 
USAA cannot seriously argue that policies of the type it 
sold to Calame do not cover liability arising out of activities 
unrelated to home ownership. No where in either USAA's homeowners 
policy or the umbrella policy issued to Calame is personal 
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liability coverage limited to acts incidental to home ownership. 
USAA's personal umbrella policy purchased by Calame defines injury 
within its coverage to include the very claims asserted against 
Calame in the underlying McCoy lawsuit. The policy reads in 
relevant part: 
We will pay for injury or damage for which an 
insured becomes legally liable. This 
liability must arise from an occurrence which 
takes place during the policy period. 
* * * * 
We will also insure against liability 
occurrences that are not covered by primary 
insurance. . . . 
* * * * 
(5) 'Injury7 means the following: 
(a) Bodily injury. 
(b) Mental injury. 
(c) Wrongful eviction or detention. 
(d) Liable. 
(e) Slander. 
(f) Defamation of character. 
(g) Invasion of privacy. 
(h) False arrest or imprisonment. 
(i) Malicious prosecution or 
humiliation. 
(j) Assault and battery if 
committed by an insured or at his 
direction to protect persons or 
property and if the conduct is not 
criminal. 
(Addendum B, pp. 1 of 6, or p. 6 or pp. 2 of 6, or pp. 7 and 8 
(underlined portions of above quote is appellants emphasis)). 
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It is clear that coverage provided by USAA's policies 
purchased by Calame is not limited to liability incidental to home 
ownership, whatever this term means. Such a conclusion would be 
counter to the language in the contracts themselves. The holding 
in Alsop cannot be distorted by USAA to change the contractual 
language in its policies. Whether coverage under USAA's policies 
is excluded depends upon the exclusionary language in the insurance 
contracts not whether the activity giving rise to the liability is 
"incidental to home ownership." 
USAA's policies exclude coverage for liability arising 
out of a business engaged in by its insured. The homeowner's 
policy defines business as a "trade, profession or occupation." 
(Addendum A). The business exclusion in USAA's Umbrella policy 
excludes liability arising from "the business profession or 
occupation of an insured." (Addendum B). USAA is not entitled to 
an interpretation of the business which is broader than what the 
policy itself provides since exclusion provisions in insurance 
policies are strictly constructed against the insured. Home Sav. 
& Loan v. Aetna Cas. Sur., 817 P.2d 341, 348 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Neither policy excludes from coverage every endeavor of an insured 
which might generate money or an endeavor which might be the 
regular trade, professional or occupation of someone other than the 
insured although it is not the insured's. 
As argued in Calame's initial Brief, Calame's trade, 
profession or occupation is not that of a book researcher and his 
involvement with The Real McCoy was unrelated to his professional 
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private investigation business. Thus, the business pursuit 
exclusions in USAA's policies purchased by Calame cannot be 
construed to exclude coverage for liability arising out of Calame's 
involvement with The Real McCoy simply because Calame might alize 
some financial gain from his involvement or because book research 
is the regular trade, profession or occupation of others. The 
cases cited by Calame in his initial brief support this conclusion. 
The cases cited by USAA in point I of its argument do not 
support USAA's claim that Calame was engaged in a business pursuit 
as defined in its policies. In Alsop an insured who was a 
chiropractor by profession sought coverage under his homeowner's 
policy for damage claims arising out of his chiropractic treatment 
of a woman. The insured conceded that his treatment of the woman 
constituted "professional services" and "business pursuits". 
Instead, the insured sought coverage under the theory that although 
the negligence and malpractice claims were excluded from coverage, 
the fraud, breach of warranty and unlicensed practice of medicine 
claims asserted against him were not a part of the business or 
professional services rendered. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Alsop, 709 
P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985). The court rejected this argument 
stating that all of the claims against the insured chiropractor 
arose out of his professional capacity as a chiropractor. Id. In 
Calame's case, he does not concede his work as the researcher of 
The Real McCoy constituted his profession or business. Nor, is the 
issue which the court in Alsop resolved present in the instant 
case, i.e., whether an insured can avoid the business exclusion by 
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arguing that some claims arising out of the same activity are 
covered and others are not. Calame has no quarrel with the court's 
reasoning and conclusions in Alsop. However, the case is factually 
irrelevant to his. 
In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 549 S.2d 1200 (D.C.A. 
Fla. 1989), cited by USAA, an insured doctor pulled on a fellow 
physician's stethoscope while it was draped around her neck during 
a confrontation regarding the care and treatment of a mutual 
patient. The court concluded that the physician's homeowner's 
policy did not provide coverage because the injury arose out of a 
business pursuit. The distinguishing aspect of Liberty Mutual is 
that the insured's profession is that of physician and the injuries 
arose out of activities directly related to that profession. As 
discussed throughout his initial Brief and this Brief, this is not 
the case with Calame. 
Similarly, in USAA v. Schneider, 620 F. Supp. 246 (D. C. 
N.Y. 1985), John McEnroe was sued by a spectator with whom McEnroe 
had an altercation at one of McEnroe's matches. The court 
concluded that the altercation arose out of McEnroe's business 
pursuit and coverage for the claim was excluded under McEnroe's 
homeowner's policy. Again, in Schneider the insured was engaging 
in his profession when the claim against the insured arose. Calame 
was not engaging in his profession or occupation with his 
involvement with The Real McCoy. 
The cases cited by USAA do not control the issue before 
this court since the cases are clearly distinguishable. Nor, do 
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the cases change the scope of coverage provided under the policies 
as defined by the policies. Rather, the court must decide this 
case according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the policies 
language. The business pursuit exclusions in USAA's policies sold 
to Calame do not exclude coverage for claims against Calame arising 
out of his involvement with The Real McCoy. Calame's involvement 
with The Real McCoy was not part of his private investigation 
business. Calame was not asked to assist Rhodes with the book 
because Calame was a private investigator; nor, did Rhodes hire 
Calame as a private investigator. Calame was sought out because of 
his substantial knowledge of the two skyjacking cases written about 
in The Real McCoy and agreed to participate in the project because 
of his own interest in the book's thesis. Calame's involvement 
with The Real McCoy was his first and only experience with book 
researching. Judge Noel erred in concluding Calame's involvement 
with The Real McCoy constituted a business pursuit as defined in 
the insurance policies USAA sold to Calame. 
II 
CALAHE'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE REAL McCOY WAS 
NOT ACTIVITY "INCIDENTAL" TO CALAME#S "TRADE, 
PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION" 
In Point II of its argument, USAA argues that although 
Calame may claim that his "trade, profession or occupation11 is not 
that of a book researcher, his work on The Real McCoy is 
nevertheless "incidental" to his profession as an FBI agent and 
private investigator and accordingly Calame was engaged in a 
business pursuit excluded under its policies. However, USAA's 
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argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, the facts clearly 
establish that Calame's involvement with The Real McCoy was not 
"incidental" to his trade, profession or occupation. Second, USAA 
misapplies the rule of law upon which it relies in that the case 
law clearly establishes that one can perform activities outside 
one's employment similar to activities during employment which will 
not be found "incidental" to one's employment. 
The fact that Calame was involved with The Real McCoy 
because of knowledge acquired while an FBI agent does not render 
his involvement "incidental" to his profession as an FBI agent. 
Calame became involved with The Real McCoy in 1983. Calame has not 
worked as an FBI agent since 1972. Nor, was Calame acting in any 
official or quasi official capacity when he researched The Real 
McCoy. The facts also establish that Calame's involvement with The 
Real McCoy was not incidental to his profession as a private 
investigator. Calame was not asked by Rhodes to become involved 
with the book because Calame was a private investigator; nor was 
Calame hired to do private investigatory work. 
The cases cited by USAA in support of the proposition 
that activities incidental to one's employment constitute a 
business pursuit involved situations where at the time the 
activities giving rise to the claim against the insured, the 
insured was acting in his professional capacity or working in his 
occupation. The cases do not stand for the proposition that tasks 
performed in an endeavor unrelated to one's regular trade, 
profession or occupation yet possibly similar to some tasks which 
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would be performed in one's regular trade, profession or occupation 
are incidental to an insured's business pursuit. 
In American Family Family Mut. Ins, Co. v. Nickerson, 813 
F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1987), cited by USAA, the court held that an off 
duty policy officer's shooting of a motorist after flashing his 
badge and identifying himself as a police officer were activities 
incidental to the officer's regular employment where the police 
manual imposes upon officers the obligation to respond to suspected 
criminal activity even while off duty. Id. at 136-137. In 
Nickerson the insured's conduct was directly related to, and in 
fact, mandated by his regular employment. In Calame's case, Calame 
was not working as a private investigator or an FBI agent during 
his involvement with The Real McCoy. Nickerson is not relevant to 
this case. 
USAA also cites Desormeaux v. Romero, 560 S.2d 658 (La. 
Ct. App. 1990). In Romero the court concluded that the business 
pursuit exclusion in a homeowner's policy precluded coverage for a 
claim against a private investigator's alleged defamatory 
statements made while employed as a private investigator and made 
in connection with the objectives of the investigation. Id. at 
660. As with Nickerson, Romero is inapplicable to Calame's case 
because Calame was not employed as a private investigator by Rhodes 
at anytime. Calame's involvement with The Real McCoy was 
essentially a hobby. Calame was interested in the book's thesis 
and gained knowledge of the book' subject matter over ten years 
before his involvement with the project. 
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Contrary to USAA's argument, several insurance coverage 
cases construing business pursuit exclusions establish that one can 
perform activities outside one's regular employment similar to 
activities performed during his employment and these activities 
will not be found incidental to his employment for purposes of the 
business pursuit exclusion• In Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. 
Duncan, 206 SE.2d 672 (Ga. 1974) an automobile mechanic engaged in 
part-time racing activities. The mechanic occasionally won prize 
money and sometimes hired other drivers to race his vehicles for 
him. The court held that the mechanic was not engaged in a 
"business pursuit" within the policy's exclusion. 
In Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Vulmarkovic, 562 NE.2d 
1073 (1990) the court held that an insured limousine driver was not 
engaged in a business pursuit when he struck a pedestrian after he 
had dropped of his last fare even though the limousine driver was 
on call 24 hours a day. The insurer argued that the insured had 
merely stopped for dinner as a minor interruption of his business 
pursuit of returning the car to his garage. The court stated that 
this argument would only be possible if the accident had occurred 
while the insured was driving from one job to another, from a lunch 
break to another job, or was on his way home directly after 
dropping off his fare. The court stated that the fact that the 
limousine driver was on call 24 hours a day did not mean that 
whenever he was driving a limousine he was engaged in a business 
pursuit. 
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In USAA v, Pennington, 810 SW.2d 777 (Tex. Ct. App. - San 
Antonio 1991). The insured ran a quarter horse breeding business 
with his father. Apart from the breeding business with his father, 
the insured purchased a quarter horse in order to experiment with 
new training systems to condition horses for racing competition. 
The insured placed an advertisement in a local newspaper to hire 
someone to ride the horse. Penny Pennington answered the 
advertisement and during her interview Pennington was asked to 
demonstrate her riding abilities by riding the horse. The horse 
reared while Pennington was mounted on her and Pennington sustained 
injuries. USAA denied coverage for Pennington's claim against its 
insured, invoking the business pursuit exclusion. A jury found 
that the insured's enterprise with the horse was not a business 
pursuit, thus establishing USAA's responsibility to defend its 
insured. USAA appealed claiming the evidence was factually and 
legally insufficient to support the jury's finding and that the 
evidence established as a matcer of law that the ownership of the 
horse was a business pursuit. The Texas Court of Appeals 
disagreed, holding that the evidence did not establish as a matter 
of law that the ownership of the quarter horse was a business 
pursuit and that the evidence was both legally and factually 
sufficient to support the jury's finding that it was not. Id. at 
782. 
USAA in this case incorrectly implies case law finding 
certain activities incidental to an insured's employment. The 
facts set forth in Calame's initial brief establish that Calame's 
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involvement with The Real McCoy was not incidental to his regular 
profession as a private investigator. Calame's involvement with 
The Real McCoy was not incidental to his former employment as an 
FBI agent. Calame,s involvement with The Real McCoy began nearly 
10 years after Calame terminated his employment as an FBI agent. 
USAA also relies upon three California cases for the 
proposition that "an activity not connected with the primary 
occupation of the insured, or which may occur on a one time basis, 
is nevertheless properly excluded as an excluded business pursuit." 
(USAA's Brief p. 14). However, these California cases go well 
beyond the specific language in the policies exclusionary 
provisions and employee an expansive interpretation of the business 
pursuit exclusion. Such an expansive construction of exclusionary 
language is contrary to well-settled rules of insurance contract 
construction adopted by this court and the Utah Supreme Court. 
Insurance policy interpretation begins with examination 
of the insurance contract itself. LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life 
Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah, 1988). When the provisions in 
the policy being interpreted are exclusionary provisions, they 
should be strictly construed against the insurer, id. at 859; Home 
Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. Sur.f 817 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Most importantly, the court's interpretation of the insurance 
policy should be guided by the rule that an insured is entitled to 
the broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be 
provided. Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P. 2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 
1985). 
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USAA's homeowner7s policy excludes liability arising v. .t 
of "business pursuits." This otherwise general and vague term is 
defined in the policy: "'Business7 includes trade, profession or 
occupation." (Addendum p. 2 of 18 or p. 5). USAA's personal 
umbrella policy excludes liability arising from "the business 
profession or occupation of an insured." (Addendum B p. 506 or p. 
10). Neither policy defines business to include every activity 
which might result in money to an insured whether or not the 
activity is part-time or whether or not the activity is the regular 
trade profession or occupation of the insured. USAA could have 
easily so defined the business pursuits in its policies. They did 
not, Since the activities associated with Calame's involvement 
with The Real McCoy are not clearly excluded from coverage, it is 
presumed that such activities are covered under the policies. LPS 
Hospital v. Capitol Life Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988) (citing 
Phil Schroeder, Inc v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 659 P.2d 509, 511 
(Wash. 1983) . 
Employing the reasoning of the California cases cited by 
USAA contradicts established rules of insurance law construction; 
whereas the numerous cases cited by Calame interpret business 
pursuits exclusions in a manner consistent with these rules. To 
deny Calame coverage for the lawsuit arising out of his involvement 
with The Real McCoy by employing USAA's broad and expansive 
interpretation of the business pursuit exclusion would wrongly deny 
Calame the broadest protection he could have reasonably unde^ tood 
to be provided by the policy. Calame purchased two policies from 
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IF THIS COURT FINDS THE BUSINESS PURSUIT 
EXCLUSIONS CONTAINED IN USAA'S POLICIES 
TO BE AMBIGUOUS, THE EXCLUSIONS ARE 
c-'WCfreuED AGAINST USAA TO AVOT^ A ^ENTAT ~^ " 
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argument USAA quotes some language from, an Idaho case wherein the 
court c o r r 1 1 1 ^ ^ ^w * Kuniness pursuit exclusion appliec _e 
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regarding what would be the result n the provision were ambiguous. 
Black y. F i rep n '_£_ ^nd American _ Ins , • " ^  * " " *~ I. 
*
 l
 '^ Black case is • -levari : . .*..- w.ise. 
Firs- , '. rie issue decided i n Black was not whether an ambiguous 
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insurance provision should be resolved in favor of the insured. 
The court had concluded that the provision was unambiguous. 
Second, and most importantly, the Black case is out of Idaho and 
cannot change Utah law on this point which is that ambiguous 
provisions in insurance contracts are construed against the insurer 
without resort to extrinsic evidence: 
'Exclusion clauses are strictly construed 
against the insurer, especially if they are of 
uncertain import. An insurer may, of course, 
cut off liability under its policy with a 
clear language, but it cannot do so with that 
dulled by ambiguity. As with the provisions 
of the policy as a whole, so also with the 
exceptions to the liability of the insured, 
the language must be construed so as to give 
the insurer the protection which he reasonably 
had a right to expect; and to that end any 
doubts, ambiguities and uncertainties arising 
out of the language used in the policy must be 
resolved in his favor. 
LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P. 2d at 859 (quoting 
Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 659 P.2d at 511; see 
also Utah Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Orville Andrews & Sons, 665 
P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983); Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. 
Co.. 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979); Metro. Prop. & Sign Liability 
v. Finlayson. 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, 
if this court concludes that the business pursuit exclusions are 
ambiguous this court is bound to construe the policies against USAA 
to avoid a denial of coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Calame respectfully 
requests that this court reverse the trial court's order granting 
USAA's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Calame's Motion for 
S" immai ^ J i idgment and remai id the erase !:: :: I::l le tri a] coi ir t f :>i 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Cciidme's remain , nu . , ; - i i n s 
DATED t h i i ." •••- day of December, iT^i 
BARMAN E . K I P F 
KIRK G. G I B B S 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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